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Abstract
This letter explores the di¤erent implications of patent breadth and R&D subsidies
on economic growth and endogenous market structure in a Schumpeterian model. We
nd that the two policy instruments have the same positive e¤ect on economic growth
when the model exhibits scale e¤ects under a xed number of rms. When the model
becomes scale-invariant under an endogenous number of rms, patent breadth increases
economic growth but decreases the number of rms, whereas R&D subsidies increase
the number of rms but decrease economic growth.
JEL classication: O30, O40
Keywords: economic growth, endogenous market structure, patents, R&D subsidies
Angus C. Chu: angusccc@gmail.com. Durham Business School, Durham University, Durham, UK.
Yuichi Furukawa: you.furukawa@gmail.com. School of Economics, Chukyo University, Nagoya, Japan.
1
1 Introduction
In this letter, we consider a simple Schumpeterian growth model to explore the di¤erent
implications of two important policy instruments, patent breadth and R&D subsidies, on
economic growth and endogenous market structure (EMS) measured by the number of rms
in equilibrium. We nd that these two policy instruments have the same positive e¤ect
on economic growth when the model exhibits scale e¤ects under a xed number of rms.1
Interestingly, when the model does not exhibit scale e¤ects under an endogenous number of
rms, the two policy instruments have drastically di¤erent implications on economic growth
and market structure. Specically, patent breadth increases economic growth but decreases
the number of rms, whereas R&D subsidies increase the number of rms but decrease
economic growth. We explain the intuition of these results in the main text.
This study relates to the literature on R&D-driven economic growth; see Romer (1990),
Segerstrom et al. (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992)
for seminal studies. Subsequent studies in this literature often apply variants of the R&D-
based growth model to analyze the e¤ects of policy instruments, such as patent breadth and
R&D subsidies, on economic growth and innovation; see for example, Segerstrom (2000),
Li (2001), Goh and Olivier (2002), Iwaisako and Futagami (2012), Chu (2011), Chu and
Furukawa (2011) and Chu et al. (2012). However, these studies do not analyze the e¤ects of
patent policy on EMS;2 therefore, the present study contributes to the literature with a novel
analysis of patent breadth in a Schumpeterian growth model with EMS. Furthermore, we
contrast the di¤erent e¤ects of patent breadth and R&D subsidies. For example, Li (2001)
nds that both of these policy instruments contribute to increasing economic growth in a
Schumpeterian growth model that exhibits scale e¤ects. However, we nd that under a scale-
invariant Schumpeterian growth model with EMS, the e¤ects of patent breadth and R&D
subsidies become drastically di¤erent suggesting the importance of taking into consideration
EMS when performing policy analysis in R&D-based growth models.3
The rest of this letter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the Schumpeterian growth
model with EMS. Section 3 analyzes the e¤ects of patent breadth and R&D subsidies.
2 A Schumpeterian growth model with EMS
In summary, the model is based on a monopolistically competitive version of the R&D-based
growth model with in-house R&D and EMS in Peretto (1996). We incorporate into the model
patent breadth and R&D subsidies to analyze their di¤erent implications on economic growth
and market structure.
1See Laincz and Peretto (2006) for a discussion of scale e¤ects in R&D-based growth models.
2See Peretto (1996, 1999) for seminal studies in R&D-based growth models with EMS and Etro (2012)
for an excellent textbook treatment of this topic.
3Segerstrom (2000) also analyzes the e¤ects of R&D subsidies in a scale-invariant R&D-based growth
model and shows that R&D subsidies can have either positive or negative e¤ects on economic growth. His
interesting results are driven by a di¤erent mechanism that is the tradeo¤ between vertical and horizontal
innovation; in contrast, economic growth in our model is solely based on quality improvement.
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2.1 Households
There is a unit continuum of identical households, who have a lifetime utility function.
U =
1Z
0
e t lnCtdt, (1)
where Ct denotes consumption of nal goods (numeraire) at time t. The parameter  > 0
determines the rate of subjective discounting. Each household maximizes (1) subject to the
following asset-accumulation equation.
_At = rtAt + wtL   t   Ct. (2)
At is the real value of assets owned by each household, and rt is the real interest rate. The
household has a labor endowment of L units and supplies them inelastically to earn a real
wage rate wt. The household also faces a lump-sum tax  t from the government. The familiar
Euler equation is
_Ct
Ct
= rt   . (3)
2.2 Final goods
Final goods Yt are produced by competitive rms that aggregate intermediate goods Xt(i)
for i 2 [0; Nt] using a standard CES aggregator given by
Yt =
Z Nt
0
[Xt(i)]
(" 1)="di
"=(" 1)
, (4)
where " > 1 is the elasticity of substitution. The conditional demand function for Xt(i) is
Xt(i) = [pt(i)]
 "Yt, (5)
where pt(i) is the price of Xt(i).
2.3 Intermediate goods and in-house R&D
There is a continuum of industries producing di¤erentiated intermediate goods. Each indus-
try is dominated by a monopolistic rm with the following production function.
Xt(i) = Zt(i)[Lx;t(i)  ], (6)
where  > 0 is a xed operating cost, which is a common feature in this class of models
with in-house R&D and EMS, and Lx;t(i) is the number of workers employed in industry
i 2 [0; Nt] for production. The law of motion for technology Zt(i) is
_Zt(i) = 'Zt(i)Lz;t(i), (7)
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where ' > 0 determines R&D productivity, and Lz;t(i) is the number of workers employed
in industry i for R&D.
The value of the monopolistic rm in industry i is
Vt(i) =
Z 1
t
exp

 
Z u
t
rvdv

u(i)du, (8)
where the ow prot at time t is
t(i) = pt(i)Xt(i)  wtLx;t(i)  (1  s)wtLz;t(i), (9)
where the parameter s 2 (0; 1) is the rate of R&D subsidies. The monopolistic rmmaximizes
(8) subject to (5) and (7). The current-value Hamiltonian of this optimization problem is
Ht(i) = t(i) + t(i) _Zt(i). (10)
We solve this optimization problem in the appendix and nd that the unconstrained prot-
maximizing markup ratio is "=("  1). To analyze the e¤ects of patent breadth, we impose
an upper bound  > 1 on the markup ratio.4 Therefore, the equilibrium price becomes
pt(i) = min

;
"
"  1

wt
Zt(i)
. (11)
For the rest of this study, we assume that  < "=(" 1). In this case, a larger patent breadth
 leads to a higher markup, and this implication is consistent with Gilbert and Shapiros
(1990) seminal insight on breadth as the ability of the patentee to raise price.
2.4 Government
The government chooses an exogenous rate s of R&D subsidies. To balance the scal budget,
the government levies a lump-sum tax  t on households. The balanced budget condition is
 t = swt
Z Nt
0
Lz;t(i)di. (12)
3 Patent breadth versus R&D subsidies
Following Peretto (1996, 1999), we consider a symmetric equilibrium in which Zt(i) = Zt for
i 2 [0; Nt], by assuming that any new entry at time t has access to the level of aggregate
technology Zt.5 Free entry implies Vt = 0, which determines the equilibrium number of rms.
Imposing symmetry across i 2 [0; Nt] yields the labor-market clearing condition given by
L = Nt(Lx;t + Lz;t). (13)
4See also Li (2001), Goh and Olivier (2002), Iwaisako and Futagami (2012), Chu (2011), Chu and Fu-
rukawa (2011) and Chu et al. (2012) for a similar formulation.
5Peretto (1996) justies this assumption by arguing that knowledge is embodied in workers. Therefore,
when a new rm recruits workers from existing rms, it also gains access to their knowledge.
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Substituting (6) into (4) yields the aggregate production function of Yt given by
Yt = (Nt)
"=(" 1)Zt (Lx;t   ) . (14)
The resource constraint implies Ct = Yt.
At the steady state,6 Nt and Lx;t are stationary. Therefore, the steady-state equilibrium
growth rate is
g 
_Ct
Ct
=
_Yt
Yt
=
_Zt
Zt
= 'Lz. (15)
We will show that the equilibrium growth rate is free of scale e¤ects (i.e., g is independent
of L) when the number of rms is endogenous.
Solving the dynamic optimization in (10),7 we obtain
Lx =
1  s


"
"  1


'
+ , (16)
which is decreasing in patent breadth  and R&D subsidy s. Combining (16) and (13) yields
Lz =
L
N
  Lx = L
N
  1  s


"
"  1


'
  . (17)
Equation (17) shows that when the number of rms N is exogenous, the model exhibits scale
e¤ects (i.e., g = 'Lz is increasing in L); in this case, g = 'Lz would be increasing in patent
breadth  and R&D subsidy s. These results are standard in the literature; see for example
Li (2001).
When the number of rms is endogenous, we have a free-entry condition given by Vt = 0,
which requires t = 0. Substituting (6) and (11) into (9) yields
t = 0, wt[Lx   ] = wtLx + (1  s)wtLz. (18)
We use (16), (17) and (18) to solve for the steady-state equilibrium values of fLz; Ng.
Lz =
  1


"
"  1


'
  
1  s , (19)
N =

  s


"
"  1


'
 

s
1  s


 1
L, (20)
where N is increasing in L. Recall that the steady-state equilibrium growth rate is g =
'Lz; therefore, (19) shows that g is independent of L. This model features the following
counterintuitive properties that the growth rate is decreasing in R&D productivity ' and
increasing in the discount rate  due to endogenous entries. The intuition is that high R&D
productivity and a low discount rate attract entries, and the resulting larger number of rms
reduces the amount of labor available for each rm.
6One can show that the steady state is globally stable.
7Derivations are relegated to Appendix A.
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As for the e¤ects of patent breadth, Lz is increasing in , and N is decreasing in .
Intuitively, a larger  increases the markup and the protability of each intermediate goods
rm; as a result, R&D increases to satisfy the zero-prot free-entry condition. Because the
increase in Lz is larger than the decrease in Lx, the number of rms N decreases to satisfy
the resource constraint on labor.
As for the e¤ects of R&D subsidies, Lz is decreasing in s, and N is increasing in s.
Intuitively, an increase in s decreases the cost of R&D but also leads to a smaller Lx reducing
the size and protability of each intermediate goods rm. The negative protability e¤ect
dominates the positive R&D-cost e¤ect rendering a reduction in R&D Lz (unless the xed
operating cost  is zero in which case the two e¤ects cancel each other and R&D Lz would
be unchanged). Finally, due to the reduction in Lz and Lx, the number of rms N increases
to satisfy the resource constraint on labor.
We conclude this letter by summarizing our results in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Under an exogenous number of rms, the equilibrium growth rate is increas-
ing in patent breadth and R&D subsidies. Under an endogenous number of rms, a larger
patent breadth increases the equilibrium growth rate but decreases the equilibrium number of
rms, whereas a higher rate of R&D subsidies increases the equilibrium number of rms but
decreases the equilibrium growth rate.
Appendix A
Derivations of Lx. Substituting (5), (6) and (9) into (10) yields
Ht(i) = (Yt)
1=" [Zt(i)]
(" 1)="[Lx;t(i) ](" 1)=" wtLx;t(i) (1 s)wtLz;t(i)+t(i)'Zt(i)Lz;t(i).
(A1)
The rst-order conditions include
@Ht(i)
@Lx;t(i)
=
"  1
"
(Yt)
1=" [Zt(i)]
(" 1)="[Lx;t(i)  ] 1="   wt = 0, (A2)
@Ht(i)
@Lz;t(i)
=  (1  s)wt + t(i)'Zt(i) = 0, (A3)
@Ht(i)
@Zt(i)
=
"  1
"
(Yt)
1=" [Zt(i)]
 1="[Lx;t(i)  ](" 1)=" + t(i)'Lz;t(i) = rtt(i)  _t(i). (A4)
Using (5) and (6), we can derive from (A2) the unconstrained prot-maximizing price in
(11). Substituting (5), (11) and (A3) into (A4), we obtain

1  s

"  1
"

'[Lx;t(i)  ] + 'Lz;t(i) = rt  
_t(i)
t(i)
. (A5)
Applying r = + g and imposing symmetry and balanced growth on (A5) yield (16).
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